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When you've walked a long time on the floor of a river,
And up the steps and into the different rooms,
You know where the hills are going, you can feel them,
The far blue hills dissolving in luminous water,
The solvent mountains going home to the oceans.
Even when the river is low and clear,
And the waters are going to sleep in the upper swales,
You can feel the particles of the shining mountains
Moping against your ankles toward the sea.'
+ Justice Hobbs authored a prior article appearing in the Water Law Review.
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An HistoricalOverview, 1 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 1 (1997). His experience with the 1969 Act commenced when he became a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General in January of 1975 and extended to his private
practice before taking the oath of office as a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
on May 1, 1996.
1. Thomas Hornsby Ferril, Time of Mountains, in

119, 122 (Alison Hawthorne Deming ed., 1996).
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THE LAY OF THE LAND

The Great Divide is the great reality of Colorado, the mother of
many rivers-the Platte (North and South), the Republican, the
Arkansas, the Rio Grande, and the Colorado complex (San Juan,
Dolores, Gunnison, Colorado, White, and Yampa)-and so many
tributaries magnifying them.
The authors of the Water Right Determination and Administration
Act of 1969' ("the 1969 Act") felt the many rivers powerfully. Like
Thomas Hornsby Ferril, they walked uphill into them from boundary
to source. They explored their currents' resistance but resisted the
temptation to settle for less than the fullest exploration they could
muster. They summitted. From the Divide they could clearly see the
lay of the land. From the cirques and seeps of the high range they saw
the waters form and flow like the fingers of two hands extending from
the spine of the earth's body towards two great oceans. Schooled in
the long climb and inspired by vistas, they resolved to have Colorado
water adjudication and administration track the contours of its major
watersheds.
At least one early visionary had called for political boundaries and
water jurisdictions to match watersheds. In 1889, addressing the
Montana constitutional convention, John Wesley Powell unsuccessfully
proposed that Montana employ divisions between hydrographic basins
when establishing county boundaries for the new state. Powell felt
this would make political and economic unity possible. Within a
drainage basin, the controlling element of water could tie together
timber, grazing, and agriculture. The state could establish local selfgovernment within each basin; the federal government could cede to
the basin-county entities all the public lands within its limits; and
locally elected water-masters could establish water rights within those
limits, enforceable by local courts.4
Powell arrived both too late and too early for Colorado. He was
too late because in 1859 the discovery of gold set into motion political
and organizational energy based on an "it's there, let's just take and
use it" approach to public domain resources. He was too early because
it took 110 years of water rights experience before the state decided
that adjudication and administration of water along major watershed
lines made more sense than dependence on county boundaries,
particularly since counties in Colorado did not encompass logical
hydrologic units.
Ironically, before Colorado became a territory, its land area lay
within large, loosely organized and sparsely populated watershed
boundaries. Between 1854 and 1861, the Territories of Nebraska

2. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
3. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL
AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST 315-16 (1954).
4. Id. at 315.
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(Platte basin), Kansas (Arkansas basin), New Mexico (Rio Grande
basin), and Utah (Colorado basin) stretched to the Continental
Divide. But, in 1861, two years after the discovery of gold at the
confluence of the South Platte River and Cherry Creek, Congress
united the sources of these great rivers into one great headwaters
territory, Colorado.6 Local districts became the organizing principle.
Successful political energy in organizing mining districts led to
subsequent successful efforts to create the Colorado territory and,
then, the State of Colorado. By 1900, however, mining engaged only
five percent of the state's population, while farming and ranching had
become a major industry throughout the state.'
Where major
mountain streams met the plains on the Eastern slope, urban
Colorado began to take shape as the 20th century progressed.9 Many
of the mountain towns continued to serve as health spas and
recreational centers, despite boom and bust in the mining industry.0
All of these activities required water.
D~jA vu, Powell! In 1969, the State of Colorado-with a myriad of
beneficial uses in place, no end of continued growth in sight, and
federal and interstate demands for water pressing the contours of its
water law-replaced its seventy water districts with seven water
divisions organized along major watershed geography, with a water
court and division engineer in each, for adjudicating and
administering its most persistently valuable treasure, the water of its
natural streams."
The century's lessons led to this deft reorganization; the prospects
of a future century will follow its lead and, inevitably, the people's
future responses to the watercourses will reshape its terms.
II. WATERS OF THE NATURAL STREAM
For all his knowledge of the Western landscape, his audacious
physical and political explorations, his commitment to progressive
planning and management, and his fascination with irrigated
agriculture as the enduring heritage of the Western movement, Powell
could not have foreseen the multi-dimensional role of water in the
settled West's future economies. In his 1879 Arid Lands Report, for
example, he predicated that "[a]ll of the waters of all the arid lands

5. See LEROY R. HAFEN & ANNW. HAFEN, COLORADO: A STORY OF THE STATE AND ITS
PEOPLE 122 (1947).
6. See CARLABBOTr ET AL., COLORADO: A HISTORY OF THE CENTENNIAL STATE65 (3d
ed. 1994).
7. See id. at 63. In 1859-60, Boulder county had eight mining districts, Clear Creek
had twenty-seven, and Gilpin had another twenty-seven.
8. MEL GRIFFITHS & LYNNELL RUBRIGHT, COLORADO: A GEOGRAPHY 215 (1983).

9. See id. at 291-92.
10. See id. at 292-94.
11. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, §§ 148-211 to -6, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200-24 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3792-101 to -602 (1999)).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

will eventually be taken from their natural channels, and they can be
utilized only to the extent to which they are thus removed, and water
rights must of necessity be severed from the natural channels."' 2
But Colorado, like the other Western states, discovered that it
lacked the means, the right, and the will to dry up all the streams.
Downstream states; Native Americans; federal reservations; the utility
and joy of a flowing stream for fishing, boating, and walking along
through urban drainage ways and rural meanderings; in sum, the
people's changing values and customs at work and at play, intruded.
In his later writings, Powell's biographer, Wallace Stegner, turned
our attention to the need for settling in:
At least in geographical terms, the frontiers have been explored and
crossed. It is probably time we settled down. It is probably time we
looked aroundus instead of looking ahead. We have no business, any

longer, in being impatient with history. We need to know our history
in much greater depth, even back into the geology, which, as Henry
Adams said, is only history projected a little way back from Mr.
Jefferson. 1

Adjudication's essential purpose, to recognize and enforce water
rights, follows from the imperatives of necessity and livability in the
land of little rain. The 1969 Act deals with settling in. Posited firmly
on the state's antecedent water law yet still breaking major new trails,
the 1969 Act addresses determination and administration of water
rights to Colorado's natural streams and groundwater tributary
thereto. It defines procedural and substantive law in regard to: (1)
water divisions, division engineers, water judges, referees, and water
clerks; (2) application and notice for determination of water rights;
(3) tabulation of water right priorities; and (4) regulation and
enforcement of water rights.' This legislation, still known as "the 1969
Act" after thirty years of legislative and judicial attention, memorializes
its bedrock durability.
The Colorado Constitution provides that the "water of every
natural stream" is subject to the prior appropriation doctrine." In a
single momentous declaration of policy opening the 1969 Act, the
General Assembly confirmed that Colorado's surface and tributary
ground water is a public resource available for disposition according to
use rights that can be decreed and administered in priority.
Commencing with a recitation that "all waters originating in or flowing
into this state, whether found on the surface or underground, have
always been and are hereby declared to be the property of the public,
12. J.W.

POwELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES

42 (1879).
13.

WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS:

LIVING AND WRITING IN THE WEST 205-06

(1992).

14. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
15. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.

REV. STAT.
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dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation and use in accordance with law,, 16 the 1969 Act declares
its intent to "integrate the appropriation, use and administration of
underground water tributary to a stream with the use of surface water,
in such a way as to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of
this state."'" Comparison with prior adjudication acts clarifies why the
1969 Act constitutes a political, legal, technical, and administrative
breakthrough of major dimensions.

m. PRIOR ADJUDICATION ACTS
In 1879, three years after statehood, the Colorado legislature
recognized the authority of the Colorado judiciary to adjudicate water
rights.18 Prior to this legislation, in 1872, the territorial supreme court
had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudge the respective
water rights of mill owners' existing uses and a domestic water
company's proposed diversion for domestic, fire fighting, and
industrial uses in Central City.' 9 The mill owners claimed existing
water power rights through prior appropriation. They entered an
agreement with the domestic water company stipulating that each
would abide by the final decision of the district court or the supreme
court regarding their respective water rights. Each would select a
"competent engineer, who shall choose a third, who shall make an
accurate measurement" of the affected waters, and would submit the
results and other testimony to the district court. ° The territorial court
refused, however, to entertain the case without a showing of injury.
The court stated:
The question propounded in this record is interesting and probably
important, but we must decline to answer it.

When it becomes

necessary to determine the rights of these parties, for the purpose of
affording relief to either of them, we will cheerfully perform that
duty, but we cannot engage in an idle discussion which would be
without any definite result or legal character.2
But the needs of a growing state required a means for recognizing,
securing, and administering water rights. The competing needs of
irrigation ditches provided the initial context for adjudication statutes.
Commencing with the Adjudication Act of 1879 ("the 1879 Act"), the
Colorado legislature established state court jurisdiction over "questions

16. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 148-212(1), 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200, 1200.

17. Id.
18. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, No. 99 SA 91
(Colo. Dec. 6, 1999) (discussing Colorado's adjudication acts and beneficial use as the
basis, measure, and limit of an appropriation).
19. Central City Water Co. v. Kimber, 1 Colo. 475, 478 (1872).
20. Id. at 477.
21. Id.at 479.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 3

of law and q[u]estions of right" regarding irrigation priorities."
Where a water district overlapped two counties, the district court for
the county that convened its first regular term the earliest in
December had jurisdiction. Through the 1879 Act, the legislature also
established the first ten water districts and the office of the district
water commissioner. The 1879 Act directed the water commissioners
to distribute water within their districts according to the "prior rights"
of "the several ditches taking water."23
The 1879 Act placed the judiciary in a proactive role. It assigned
referees the responsibility of gathering information and taking
The utilization of this
evidence regarding water rights claims.
procedure for claims to the Cache la Poudre River provoked the
district judge to question the judiciary's right to institute this inquiry in
lieu of the traditional judicial method of proceeding only when an
interested party brings a controversy to the court. The district court
refused to enter a decree, the supreme court denied a mandamus
petition, and the 1881 Adjudication Act ("the 1881 Act") resulted.24
The 1881 Act required irrigators to file their claims for priorities "on
or before the first day of June, 1881" with the district court "having
jurisdiction of riority of right to the use of water for irrigation in such
water district." Upon adjudication of the water right and payment of
the required fee, the water right owner received a certificate from the
district court clerk showing the dates and amounts of the
appropriation as well as its priority.2 6
Under the 1881 Act and subsequent statutes, a person proposing
to construct a new ditch, or an extension of an existing ditch,
submitted a map and statement of claim to the county clerk and state
engineer. 7 A typical "ditch statement" set forth the following
information under written oath: the name of the structure; a legal
description of the point of diversion and location of the length of the
ditch; the ditch's width, depth, and carrying capacity in cubic feet per
second; the name of the stream supplying the ditch; the date on which
work on the ditch commenced; the uses of water; the name of the
owner; and an accompanying plat map showing the stream and the
ditch from its point of diversion to the terminus of the claim.28
The district water commissioner for each water district had the
responsibility of checking and reporting on the condition of headgates
22. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 19, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99.
23. Id. § 18, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws at 99.
24. John E. Thorson, State Watershed Adjudications: Approaches And Alternatives, 42
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 22.03(1) (a) at 22-6 (1996).
25. Act of Feb. 23, 1881, § 1, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 142.
26. See id. § 2, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws at 144.
27. SeeAct of Feb. 11, 1881, §§ 1-2, 1881 Colo. Sess. Law 161, 161-62; see alsoJAMES
N. CORBRIDGEJR. & TERESAA. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 233 (Revised ed.

1999).
28. See, e.g., Ditch Statement and Platt of the Schuttee Ditches No. 1 and 2, Garfield
County, Colorado (Aug. 6, 1887) (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).
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and installing and measuring weirs and flumes.' When water became
scarce in a particular stream, the commissioner could curtail diversions
ofjunior priorities in favor of the seniors."0 The 1881 Adjudication Act
prohibited water commissioners from distributing water to any
structure except in accordance with the clerk's certificate evidencing
the court's judgment and decree." The commissioner also had power
to shut down wasteful diversions.3 ' By 1905, the General Assembly had
established seventy water districts existing within five irrigation
divisions.33 The irrigation divisions heralded a broader river basin
administration. The division superintendents had superior authority
34
over the water commissioners.
The General Assembly added a sixth
35
irrigation division in

1919.

Litigation revealed the limitations of the 1879 and the 1881 Acts.
First, only irrigation rights could be adjudicated under the special
statutory proceeding the legislature had instituted. Domestic users, for
example, could not obtain judicial recognition of their rights. The
court in Platte Water Company v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co. stated:
" [t] he proceedings under said acts are purely statutory, and cannot be
resorted to for the purpose of determining the claims of parties to the
use of water for domestic or other purposes not fairly included within
the meaning of the term 'irrigation.' ,36 Second, the adjudications
could not affect water rights of those who had not been served with
process. Thus, they must be allowed to claim their original dates of
appropriation despite two and four year reopening and acquiescence
provisions contained in those statutes.
Later recognizing that the legislature directed the water officials to
distribute water according to the "various decrees" as if they were "in
fact, one," the court held that challenges brought by water rights
claimants of another district must be brought within four years of the
decree fixing the rights in the district of the adjudication
The court
announced that "[p]arties to adjudication proceedings in one district
are bound to take notice of the rights adjudicated in other districts

29. See, e.g., Report of Water Commissioner for Dist. No. 7 (June 18, 1887) (on file
with the Office of the Colorado State Engineer).
30. Act of Feb. 19, 1879, § 18, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94, 99; see, e.g., Letter fromJ.M.
McRay, Water Commissioner Dist. No. 7, to T. O'Connell, Superintendent of
Irrigation Div. No. 1 (Aug. 18, 1887) (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).

31.

SeeAct of Feb. 23, 1881, § 22, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142, 154-55.

32. Act of Apr. 13, 1895, ch. 85, § 1, 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws 197, 197.

33. Act of Apr. 10, 1905, ch. 111, § 2, 1905 Colo. Sess. Laws 243, 243; see Map
entitled Boundaries of Irrigation Divisions and Water Districts, State of Colorado,
Engineering Department 1915 (on file with the Office of the Colorado State
Engineer).
34.
35.
36.
37.

Act of Mar. 25, 1889, § 1, 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 469, 469.
Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 148, § 1, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 497, 497.
Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711, 712 (Colo. 1889).
Nicholas v. McIntosh, 34 P. 278, 280-81 (Colo. 1893).

38. See Ft. Lyon Canal Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet & Irrigated Land Co., 90 P.
1023, 1025 (Colo. 1907).
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whereby rights are fixed in the same stream, although they are not
adjudicated in the same action and in a common forum." 9
In the course of construing the adjudication acts and applying the
principles of res judicata to water decrees across water district lines
within the broader irrigation divisions, ° the court began to enunciate
the essential foundations of Colorado water law underpinning the
adjudication of priorities. Priority of appropriation for beneficial use
is the foundation upon which water rights depend in Colorado.4 1 A
diversion of water ripens into a valid appropriation only when the
water is actually used; however, "the priority of such an appropriation
42
may date.., from the commencement of the canal or ditch."
Adjudications could include ditches whose construction had
commenced but were unfinished. The decrees for unfinished ditches
were "conditional, subject to the completion of the ditch by the
exercise of due diligence within a reasonable time.4 3 When there had
been a lack of diligence, a conditional right, being inchoate, could
never become fully vested and superior to a right that has become fully
vested by reason of beneficial use. "[T] he court was without authority
to decree an absolute right 4 to a greater amount than was then actually
1
applied to a beneficial use."
Early, Colorado recognized water rights as property rights that
could be bought and sold. Powell advocated tying irrigation water
rights permanently to the land as the surest way to prevent monopolies
and assure settlement.46 However, Colorado chose to consider water
rights as transferable, so long as the owner accomplished the transfer
of the original appropriation without enlargement or injury to other
water rights." In 1893, the General Assembly established that the
formalities of conveying real estate would be applicable to water rights,
or in other
except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies
48
companies constituted the ownership of the right.
Needs of the rising towns and cities would inevitably lead to
legislative authorization for the adjudication of domestic, municipal,
and other beneficial uses. Without yet amending the special statutory
proceeding to so provide, the General Assembly, in 1891, recognized
water use for domestic purposes, so long as it was not applied to "land

39. Id.
40. See Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 60 P.2d 629, 630
(Colo. 1900).
41. Id.
42. Platte Water Co. v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711, 713 (Colo. 1889).
43. Id. at 712.
44. See Drach v. Isola, 109 P. 748, 752 (Colo. 1910) (holding that lapse of fifteen
years from date of decree and twenty-three years after the construction of the ditch in
putting additional claimed water to use constituted lack of diligence).
45. Id. at 751.
46. PoWELL, supra note 12, at 43.
47. Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891).
48. Act of Apr. 7, 1893, ch. 107, § 1, 1893 Colo. Sess. Laws 298, 298.
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or plants in any manner to any extent whatever."49 Using domestic
water for irrigation purposes constituted a misdemeanor punishable by
a justice of the peace subject to appeal, as in cases of assault and
battery.
The 1899 Act required adjudication for change of irrigation
rights. 50 The enactment of a comprehensive adjudication act occurred
early in the twentieth century. The 1903 Adjudication Act provided
the courts with authority to adjudicate all water rights "acquired by
appropriation and used for any beneficial purpose other than
irrigation" in the same manner as "the adjudication of water rights for
irrigation purposes in the water district in which said water rights are
situated."'
In 1919, the General Assembly enacted an adjudication limitation
act designed to settle the priorities of water rights. It required any
original claimant to an appropriation or a conditional appropriation,
or any successor in title, to submit a claim for adjudication by January
1, 1921. Failure to do so resulted in a conclusive presumption of
abandonment. 2 The legislature also established a biennial diligence
requirement for conditional water rights."
IV. ORIGINAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL ADJUDICATIONS
By the Adjudication Act of 1943 ("the 1943 Act"), the General
Assembly recodified the existing adjudication law drawing together the
provisions of separate acts and providing definitions. The 1943 Act
continued to anticipate the issuance of unitary decrees addressing all
surface rights within the water district through "original" and
"supplemental" adjudications. An original adjudication "adjudicat[ed]
water rights for all beneficial purposes in a single proceeding '54 and
could be commenced by "any owner or claimant of an unadjudicated
water right" when "there has been no previous adjudication of water
rights in said water district." 5 By "proper averment referring to the
original adjudication in the water district and to any subsequent
adjudication of a general nature, 56 a party could commence a
supplemental adjudication.
Publication of notice for original and supplemental adjudications
was by public newspaper in the water district and by mailing "to all
claimants of water rights in the water district who have filings in the
office of the state engineer of Colorado," and also to all persons
"shown to be water users by the certificate of the water commissioner

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Act of Apr. 1, 1891, § 1, 1891 Colo. Sess. Laws 402, 402.
Act of Apr. 6, 1899, § 1, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 235, 235-36.
Act of Apr. 11, 1903, ch. 130, § 1, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 297, 297.
Act of Apr. 9, 1919, ch. 147, § 2, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 487, 488-89.
Id. § 7, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws at 494.
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 3, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 615.
Id.
Id. § 7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 618.
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or Irrigation Division Engineer."57 To implement this notification
requirement, the court ordered the state engineer to certify to the
clerk of court a true and a complete list of all claimants "who have
filed maps and statements, supplemental statements or claims of any
character in his office which
shall not have been theretofore cancelled
58
by him pursuant to law.,
Water right transfers aggravated problems of notice. Transferees
of a water right could present their assignments or conveyances of
water rights to the state engineer for inspection. The state engineer
indexed the transfer and kept a record of the name and post office
address of the transferee. Transferees who did not follow this
procedure were bound by service of notice to the last person noted on
the state engineer records.59 The statute did not require service to
occur on owners of water rights or claimants of rights previously
adjudicated. But, if "the proceeding be supplemental as to one class of
rights (i.e. irrigation) and original as to another class (i.e. nonirrigation) then service shall be necessary on those whose rights have
already been adjudicated." '
The court decree entered in an original or a supplemental
adjudication determined and established "the several priorities of
right" for each structure in the water district according to the evidence61
of "the time of its construction ...extension ... or enlargement.
The decree specified the appropriation's source, point of diversion,62
location of structure, purpose, priority date, and diversion amount.
In a subsequent adjudication suit, priority dates for water rights of "the
class theretofore adjudicated" could not be set any earlier than "one
day later than the latest priority date awarded in said prior decree., 63 If
a number of structures received the same priority date due to this rule,
the court could specify in the decree the relative order of priority
between them.
While the overall adjudication proceeded, the court on sufficient
proof could award an "interlocutory decree" for a "completed
appropriation." This individual interlocutory decree would "remain in
full force and effect" pending entry of a final comprehensive case
decree.6' An interlocutory decree served as the "warrant of the state65
water officials for regulating the distribution of water accordingly.,
The notice and statement of claim provisions contemplated that
petitions for recognition of conditional water rights and changes of

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 5(b), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 616.
Id. § 5(b), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 617.
Id.
Id. § 7, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 618.
Id. § 13, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 622.
Id.
Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 13, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 623.
Id.
Id.
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water rights could also be adjudicated.6
Changes of use were sub ject to two basic predicates that date from
19th century irrigation law. First, the extent of beneficial use under
the original appropriation limited the amount of water that could be
changed to another use. Second, the change must not injure other
water rights.
By his legal appropriation of the amount of water sufficient for his
original purpose he is entitled to that amount and may apply it to any
of the beneficial uses he may see fit, as against other parties whose
rights have accrued subsequently to his own, provided the amount of
water taken by him is not thereby increased beyond that of his
original ap ropriation, nor6the rights of those coming later injured

or

impaireTn
any manner.

Accordingly, under the 1943 Act, changes in "the manner of use"
could be made in Colorado "by proper court decree" but "only to the
extent of use contemplated at the time of appropriation" and "strictly
limited to the extent of former actual usage" pursuant to the
69
appropnation.
V. TOO LITTLE DIRECTION, TOO MANY DISTRICTS
The 1943 Act provided little direction for the listing of priorities by
providing too many options. The district court could number all
"irrigation priorities" in one series and "non-irrigation priorities" in
another series; number "direct water rights" in one series and "storage
rights" in another series; number "all" rights in one series; "use a
different series for each source of water in a district;" or follow "the
existing system of numbering theretofore used in said water district."'
The state water officials were then required to regulate "the
distribution of water accordingly"!!"7
The 1943 Act perpetuated the artificiality of small water districts,
allowing separate adjudication for streams tributary to the same river.
The district court could entertain a separate adjudication for "two or
more entirely distinct sources of water in any water district. 7 2 The
1943 Act defined "distinct sources of water" as "two or more natural
stream systems or other sources of water in any water district which do
notjoin within the boundaries of such water district."' 3 The petition of
a water user in another district could force reopening of a decree
66. Id. §§ 21-22, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 628-29.
67. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Property Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, No. 99 SA 91, slip
op. at 11-12 (Colo. Dec. 6, 1999).
68. CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 233 at 375 (1894).
69. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 783 (Colo. 1962) (quoting Farmers
Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954).
70. Act of Apr. 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 14(e), (g), 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws 613, 624.

71.

Id. § 15, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 624.

72.
73.

Id. § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 614.
Id. § 2, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 615.
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entered by a district court for a water district within four years of its
entry. However, the user must not have received actual notice of the
adjudication and must have water rights "decreed or subject to decree"
in the other district." The 1943 Act did not allow for or require
adjudication of tributary groundwater.
Commenting on prior adjudication acts, George Vranesh
summarized the difficulty of administration arising from the multitude
of courts, water districts, and ways of listing priorities:
Priorities might have all been listed in one series, and there could
have been a different series for each source of water within a district.
Generally there were prefixes and suffixes to denote conditional
rights, or there might have been some peculiar historical method of

priority listing that was preserved in a particular district. In short, the
system did not provide a uniform method by which a water user could
accurately determine his priority within a particular watershed.
VI. GROUNDWATER MYSTERIES AND HYDROLOGIC
REALITIES

Colorado water law has taken shape in the interaction between the
water users, their advocates, the judiciary, the legislature, and the
water officials. Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court often
planted the seed. How to address tributary groundwater in the
absence of legislative direction, for example, became a
groundbreaking question.
In 1951, the court established a
presumption that all ground water which finds "its way to the stream in
the watershed of which it lies, is tributary thereto, and subject to
appropriation as part of the waters of the stream. 76
In response to emerging groundwater issues, the General Assembly
chose to focus first on the problem of aquifer depletion in the Eastern
high plains. In 1957, it established a Ground Water Commission,
required registration of existing wells with the state engineer, and
required
for a state engineer permit for a new well or an
•
• application
77
existing well.
Subsequently, the court: (1) determined that the
Ground Water Commission was empowered to declare and regulate
"critical ground water districts" in order to limit overdraft of aquifers;
(2) restricted the state engineer's authority to that of regulating the
drilling and construction of wells to prevent waste; (3) determined
that it had no authority to adjudicate rights to non-tributary
groundwater; and (4) determined that the state engineer had no
power to administer non-tributary groundwater. 8
In a 1961 decision, the court observed the dearth of legislation

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 17, 1943 Colo. Sess. Laws at 625.
1 GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAw § 4.1 at 384 (1987).
Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
See Act of May 1, 1957, ch. 289, §§ 3, 5, 1957 Colo.Sess. Laws 863, 863-69.
Whitten v. Coit, 385 P.2d 131, 139 (Colo. 1963).
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governing the adjudication and administration of tributary
groundwater. It nevertheless asserted a judicial responsibility to
protect "relative priorities" of waters of the natural stream "whether
visible or not" and "even though they have never been made the
subject of a statutory adjudication."7 9 The case involved competing
well users drawing water from the same tributary aquifer. The court
held that each must effectuate a reasonable means of diversion and
that no one could command the whole source of the supply merely to
facilitate taking a fraction of the flow. But, it also held that junior
users might be required to bear the expense of seniors whose
historical diversions were reasonably efficient but whose wells must
now reach deeper as a result of the junior's use.80
In 1965, the General Assembly acknowledged and acted on the
court's cue that the state should administer surface water and tributary
groundwater together. However, it did not revise the adjudication
framework to assist in meeting this goal. Instead, it directed the state
engineer to "execute and administer the laws of the state relative to
the distribution of the surface waters of the state including the
underground waters tributary thereto in accordance with the right of
priority of appropriation."81 Further, the court authorized the state
engineer to "adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as
are necessary for the performance of the foregoing duties.""
The General Assembly chose to focus on the problem of
groundwater mining in areas with little surface water. It adopted the
1965 Ground Water Management Act ("the 1965 Act") authorizing the
Ground Water Commission to supervise the establishment of
designated ground water districts where the principal reliable source
of supply is groundwater. 3 Withdrawals of designated groundwater
could be made under a modified system of prior appropriation
through the issuance of state engineer well permits pursuant to
regulations of the Commission and the local ground water district to
maintain "reasonable ground water pumping levels."84 The 1965 Act
o well permits
also provided for state engineer review
of8applications for
basins.
groundwater
designated
of
outside
Three activities precipitated the 1969 Act. First, the state engineer
began to regulate tributary groundwater wells on a case by case basis.
Second, the legislature directed the Natural Resources Department to
conduct an investigation of the interrelationship of groundwater and
surface water and recommend legislation. 6 Third, in a contested
groundwater case involving state engineer well regulation in the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555 (Colo. 1961).
Id. at 556.
Act of May 3, 1965, ch. 318, § 1, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1244, 1244.
Id.
See Act of May 17, 1965, ch. 319, §§ 1-3, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246, 1246-68.
Id. § 148-18-10(1) 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1254-55.
See id. § 148-18-36, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws at 1265-66.
See Act of Apr. 19, 1967, ch. 175, § 1, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 249, 249-50.
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Arkansas River Basin, the Colorado Supreme Court urged the state
engineer to take a more comprehensive approach by adopting
regulations.
Exclaimed Justice Groves: "It is implicit in these
constitutional provisions that, along with vested rights, there shall be
maximum utilization of the water of this state. As administration of
water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon the
new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that
doctrine can be integrated into the law of vested rights.,87 Thus, the
court ratified the General Assembly's recognition of the necessity to
integrate the use, adjudication, and administration of tributary
groundwater and surface water. The very next year the legislature
took the starring role with the adoption of the 1969 Act.8
VII. SO THE WATERS GO
ADIVIDE
The mystery of a divide
Is this, you can stand on opposites
And not lose your balance.
Draw a straight line from the sky
Through the middle of your forehead,
Half of you belongs to the other ocean.
Half your mind and half your heart,
You share downstream equally
And never drift apart.89
Cartography follows the ground. Early mapmakers got it right
when they hoofed through the territory; " they didn't when guessing
its length, breadth, and features. The 1969 legislative drafters heard
Colorado's topography of rivers practically sing to them.
The 1969 Act created seven water divisions along major
hydrographic divides, from the great divide to the borders of the state,
each with a water court, water clerk, and division engineer. The water
clerks and courts for these divisions are headquartered in: Greeley,
Division 1 (South Platte and other northeastern plains rivers); Pueblo,
Division 2 (Arkansas and other southeastern plains rivers); Alamosa,
Division 3 (Rio Grande and San Luis Valley rivers); Montrose, Division
87. Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968) (emphasis in original).
88. See Robert F. Welborn, Two Colorado Water Crises, 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 307,
308-11 (1998).
89. GregoryJ. HobbsJr., A Divide (November 1999).
90. Frank N. Schubert, A Tale of Two Cartographers:Emory, Warren, and Their Maps of
the Trans-Mississippi West, in EXPLORATION AND MAPPING OF THE AMERICAN WEST:
SELECTED ESSAYS (Donna P. Koepp, ed., 1986); JOHN NOBLE WILFORD, THE MAPMAKERS
204 (1981).
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4 (Gunnison and other central Western rivers); Glenwood Springs,
Division 5 (Colorado River from source to state line); Steamboat
Springs, Division 6 (Yampa, White, North Platte, and other
northwestern rivers); and Durango, Division 7 (San Juan, Dolores, and
other Southwestern rivers). 9'
Each water court publishes a monthly resume of applications
received."'
The resume summarizes important details of an
application; the water courts supply standardized forms for filing. 9
The resume serves as notice to all interested persons for purposes of
subject matter and personal jurisdiction.94 Persons who do not enter
the noticed proceeding remain nonetheless bound by the result.95 The
adequacy of the notice is subject to a "reasonable inquiry" standard
regarding the nature, scope, and impact of the claim.
In every water division, Colorado's adjudication is ongoing.
Pursuant to the monthly resume notice, each application proceeds to
judgment and to decree separately. If appealed, the application
continues on to the Colorado Supreme Court for review and decision
without the need to wait for any other case.97 The state engineer
compiles a tabulation of decreed water rights with their priorities and
identifying features. 9 The priority date of a water right is a function of
the year of the application's filing and the date of initiation of the first
step of the appropriation." The first step to initiate an appropriation
consists of the appropriator's intent to appropriate a specified quantity
of water from a particular source at a particular location for specified
uses and of an action evidencing that intent.' The state engineer also
compiles an abandonment list.'
One may file an application for determination of surface water
rights, tributary groundwater rights, conditional water rights, perfected
water rights, findings of reasonable diligence for conditional water
rights, changes of water rights, augmentation plans, exchanges, and
applications for out-of-state water use.' 2 Augmentation plan decrees
allow a right to be exercised out-of-priority by providing replacement
water to otherwise senior rights in an amount suitable in quantity and

91. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-201,-203,-204 (1999).
92. Id. § 37-92-302(3) (a).
93. Id. § 37-92-302(2) (a); COLO. UNIF. R. WATER CT. 3(d).
94. See Closed Basin Landowners Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734
P.2d 627, 633-34 (Colo. 1987); see also Gardner v. Colorado, 614 P.2d 357, 359-60
(Colo. 1980).
95. Williams v. Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 525 (Colo.
1997).
96. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 24 (Colo. 1996).
97. See United States v. District Court ex rel Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529
(1971); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-304(7)-(9) (1999).
98. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-401(1)(a) (1999).
99. Id. § 37-92-306.
100. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 924-25 (Colo. 1992).
101. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-402(1) (a) (1999).
102. Id. § 37-92-302(1)(a).
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quality to the affected right.'Y3
Persons with or without water rights may object to an application
and put the applicant to the required proof. Water rights holders may
insist on terms in the decree that will prevent injury to their water
rights. 04 The state engineer may object to applications and proceed as
a party. 0 5 The state and division engineers also file consultation
reports and recommendations on applications with the referees and
waterjudgesY 6
Review of an application commences with the referee for the water
division who may issue a ruling that is subject to entry by the water
judge if no objection is made. The referee may also re-refer the
application to the water judge without having made a ruling. 07 If the
referee enters a ruling, any person may file a protest with the water
clerk, and the waterjudge then hears the proceeding de novo.'0 8
The state engineer, division engineers, and water commissioners
must administer the waters of natural streams (i.e., surface water and
tributary groundwater) pursuant to judicial decrees!'
Federal
agencies and Indian Tribes are bound by the resume notice, each case
decree, and the Engineers' proper administration of decrees for waters
within Colorado, because the United States was properly joined to
Colorado's ongoing adjudication in each of the seven water divisions."0
Failure to claim one's rights in the first available adjudication,
including the failure of the United States to do so after its joinder,
results in postponement of the priority date to the year in which the
application is filed."'
Administration of non-tributary groundwater is not subject to the
doctrine of prior appropriation."2 By an amendment to the 1969 Act,
water courts may decree rights to non-tributary water outside of
designated groundwater basins according to overlying land ownership,
a hundred year aquifer life, and a withdrawal rate not exceeding one
percent per year.
Use of Denver Basin bedrock aquifer water is
subject to augmentation requirements.'
Use of designated
groundwater, which is regulated by the Colorado Groundwater
Commission pursuant to the Groundwater Management Act, is not

103. Id. § 37-92-305(3), (5), (8).
104. Shirola v. Turkey Canon Ranch Ltd. Liab. Co., 937 P.2d 739, 747 (Colo. 1997).
105. Wadsworth v. Kuiper, 562 P.2d 1114, 1116-18 (Colo. 1977).
106. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(4) (1999).
107. Id. § 37-92-303.
108. Id. § 37-92-304(2)-(3); Wadsworth, 562 P.2d at 1118-19.
109. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-301(1), -301(3), -501 to 501.5 (1999).
110. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 808
(1976).
111. United States v. Bell, 724 P. 2d 631, 641-42 (Colo. 1986).
112. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(11) (1999); see COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-203(1).
113. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(4)(a)-(b) (1999).
114. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch Ltd. Liab. Partnership v. Bargas, No. 988A208,
1999 WL 711845, at *3 (Colo. Sept. 13, 1999).
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subject to the 1969 Act."5
The state prohibits recognition of claims that are based upon the
speculative sale or transfer of appropriative rights to persons who are
not parties to an appropriation.
Conditional water rights require
making due diligence applications every six years if the conditional
decree's antedated priority is to attach to the water right when it is
eventually perfected by actual beneficial use."' Changes of water rights
are subject to quantification by historic beneficial consumptive use and
the imposition of conditions to prevent injury to other water rights.
Conditions to protect other water rights include continuation of the
historic return flows that supply other appropriations, or through
replacing water by means of a decreed augmentation plan." 9
An amendment to the 1969 Act allows the Colorado Water
Conservation Board to appropriate instream flows and minimum lake
levels under state law for preservation of the natural environment to a
reasonable degree. 20 However, only the Board may do so; all other
appropriators must• capture,
possess,
or control water in order to
•
•
121
effectuate a valid appropriation.
The 1969 Act authorizes the state engineer to issue orders for the
enforcement of decreed priorities, to adopt rules for the
administration of water rights, and to enforce water rights within
Colorado to meet the downstream delivery requirements to other
states. Colorado must deliver water down stream pursuant to nine
interstate compacts and three equitable apportionment decrees of the
United States Supreme Court, all of which affect Colorado water use. 122
Rules shall have as their objective "the optimum use of water23
consistent with preservation of the priority system of water rights.',
The state and division engineer may issue diversion curtailment
orders,'2 4 order the release of water illegally or improperly stored, 5
administer
the movement of augmentation water and of water use
•
26
projects, require the installation of measuring devises, require the
submission of periodic reports based on data from the devise 27 and
require production of energy use records from suppliers of energy

115. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-103(8), -107 (1999); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92602(1)(a) (1999); see also Chatfield East Well Co. v. Chatfield East Property Owners'
Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Colo. 1998).
116. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a), -305(9) (1999).
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119.
120.
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Id. §§ 37-92-3"01 (4) (a), -305 (1).
See id. § 37-92-305(4)(a).
Id. § 37-92-305(8).
Id. § 37-92-102(3)-(4).
Id. § 37-92-305(9)(a)-(b).
Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 917 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Colo. 1996).
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-501(2) (e) (1999).

124.

Id. § 37-92-502(2) (a).

125. Id. § 37-92-502(3).
126. Id. § 37-92-502(4).
127. Id. § 37-92-502(5) (a).
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used to pump groundwater.'28 The state engineer may seek an
injunction and damages for violation of diversion curtailment orders.12
The water officials should avoid curtailment of rights in futile call
circumstances, when shutting off diversions by juniors would not
reasonably make the water available to senior priorities. 3 °
The 1969 Act also provides for certain exemptions 3 from
1
administration, for example, for small capacity household wells.1
VIII. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE 1969 ACT
Major accomplishments of the 1969 Act include: (1) integration of
surface water and tributary groundwater into a unitary adjudication
and administration system; (2) specialized water court jurisdiction and
engineer administration on a watershed basis; (3) resume notice
procedure for obtaining jurisdiction for adjudication of rights; (4)
case-by-case decrees and appeals in the context of an ongoing and
comprehensive adjudication; (5) authorization of augmentation plans
to enable otherwise out-of-priority water use through the provision of
replacement water; (6) effective rulemaking and enforcement
authority in the state and division engineer for the protection of state,
federal, and interstate rights; and (7) explicit procedures for filing and
pursuing applications and objections to applications for water rights,
conditional water rights, changes of water rights, and augmentation
plans.
An immediate result of the 1969 Act was Colorado's ability to
proceed with adjudication and administration of federal reserved
water rights, Native American tribal rights, and state appropriative
rights. 32 The United States Supreme Court rejected assertions by the
Justice
Department
that Colorado's monthly
case-by-case
methodology did not comply with the McCarran Amendment. 33 It
vindicated the work of the 1969 Act by its opinion stating that "[t]he
present suit... reaches all claims, perhaps month by month but
inclusively in the totality; and, as we said ...if there is a collision
between prior adjudicated rights and reserved rights of the United
States, the federal question
' 34 can be preserved in the state decision and
brought here for review. ,
The 1969 Act's authorization for adjudication and administration
of augmentation plans has been particularly important to the
integration of tributary groundwater into the natural stream priority
system. An extensive well economy had grown up in over appropriated
stream systems, particularly in the South Platte and Arkansas River
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
(1971).

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-502(5)(b) (1999).
Id. § 37-92-503.
See id. § 37-92-502(2) (a).
Id. § 37-92-602(1)(b).
See generally United States v. City of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo.1982).
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
United States v. District Court ex rel Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529-30
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Basins. By utilizing such sources as mutual ditch company shares,
non-tributary water, and imported water, augmentation plans allow
Colorado to effectuate its water efficiency and optimum use policies by
allowing out-of-priority diversions that would be curtailed otherwise.
IX. CONCLUSION
The 1969 Act is a relief map to the State of the Great Divide. It
reflects the contours of Colorado's watersheds. It provides for unitary
adjudication and administration of state, tribal, and federal water
rights. Following its flow is to go the way the waters go.

135. Williams v. Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 521-22
(Colo. 1997).

